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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is a petition for review of a PSD permit issued under the
Clean Air Act by a state agency through its delegated authority of
the EPA. Petitioners Save Our Climate, Inc., and Sylvanergy,
L.L.C., timely filed petitions for review of the permit with the
Environmental Appeals Board under 40 C.F.R. pt. 124 (2015).
The EAB issued its order on June 1, 2015. Save Our Climate and
Sylvanergy then filed timely petitions for review in this Court,
less than 60 days after June 1, 2015. Sylvanergy, however, also
petitions this Court to review the state agency’s applicability
determination, which preceded the issuance of the PSD permit.
At the very latest, Sylvanergy had date notice of the applicability
determination on June 12, 2014, when the state agency issued
the PSD permit.
This Court has jurisdiction under section 42 U.S.C. §
7607(b)(1) (2012), which provides that a petition for review of
final EPA action shall be filed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the appropriate circuit within 60 days from the date
notice of the final action. Id.
Therefore, this Court has
jurisdiction over the timely-filed petitions for review of the PSD
permit issued to Sylvanergy, but does not have jurisdiction over
Sylvanergy’s petition for review of the state agency’s applicability
determination, as it was not filed within 60 days of the date
notice of the action.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. Whether this Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §
7607(b)(1) to review Sylvanergy’s untimely petition of NUARB’s
denial of its request for a Non-Applicability Determination.
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II. Whether NUARB was arbitrary and capricious in
determining that the Sylvanergy facility is a “major emitting
facility” subject to PSD review.
III. Whether Sylvanergy is subject to PSD review as an emitter of
greenhouse gases.
IV. Whether NUARB properly rejected consideration of a wood
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage plant as
BACT on the grounds that it “redefines the source.”
V. Whether NUARB properly selected the Sustainable Forest
Plan as BACT without considering its adverse environmental
impacts.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a petition for judicial review of a permitting
authority’s decision to grant a Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (“PSD”) permit to a new facility. Specifically,
Sylvanergy, L.L.C., seeks to build a new electricity generation
and wood pellet production facility in Forestdale, New Union.
Because the entire State of New Union is an attainment area,
new “major emitting” facilities are required to obtain a PSD
preconstruction permit, ensuring that their facilities will meet
certain emission limitations. These permits are reviewed and
granted by the New Union Air Resources Board (“NUARB”),
which exercises delegated authority of the EPA.
Sylvanergy’s proposed facility (the “Facility”) would operate
by way of an advanced stoker design wood-fired boiler along with
two ultra-low sulfur diesel start-up burners. The Village of
Forestdale issued a site plan approval with a limitation on the
Facility’s operating hours, limiting it to 6,500 hours per year and
a capacity factor of 75%.
Sylvanergy petitioned NUARB for a Non-Applicability
Determination (“NAD”), arguing that the PSD permitting process

3
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was not applicable to the proposed facility because its emissions
would not meet certain thresholds bringing it within the
definition of “major emitting facility,” under the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”). NUARB rejected these arguments and required that
Sylvanergy’s new facility undergo the PSD permitting process.
NUARB approved Sylvanergy’s flue controls for particulates,
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and VOCs as
constituting Best Available Control Technology (“BACT”). These
permit requirements are not being challenged. NUARB also
required Sylvanergy’s facility to undergo PSD review for
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions based on its release of 350,000
tons per year when operating at a 96% capacity factor.
Under the BACT analysis for GHGs, NUARB considered four
control technologies. It eliminated the first technology, carbon
capture and storage, on the grounds that it would not control the
CO2 from the flue controls. It eliminated the second technology,
the use of cleaner fuels, on the grounds that it would
impermissibly redefine the source by requiring the facility to
change its planned fuel. It eliminated the third technology, wood
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage, on the
grounds that it would also redefine the source. NUARB accepted
the fourth technology, a Sustainable Forest Plan, as BACT
because it would offset about 70% of GHG emissions and was
required by Executive Order 005-12, which requires state
agencies to try to achieve carbon neutrality.
Sylvanergy and Save Our Climate (“SOC”) both filed
petitions for review to the Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”).
Sylvanergy argued that it should have received its NAD and that
it was not subject to PSD review for GHG emissions. SOC
asserted that denial of the NAD was correct. However, SOC
argued it was error for NUARB to reject wood gasification and
partial carbon capture and to select the Sustainable Forest Plan
as BACT without considering the adverse environmental effects
raised during the comment period.
The EAB denied both parties’ petitions for review, stating
that neither displayed clear legal or factual error on the part of
NUARB. Both parties now seek review from this Court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts of this case center on the details of the facility that
Sylvanergy seeks to build and how those facts impact the
facility’s regulation under the CAA.
The Proposed Facility. Sylvanergy proposes to construct a
500 million Btu/hour electricity generation and wood pellet
production facility in Forestdale, New Union. R. at 5. The
Facility would include an advanced stoker design wood-fired
boiler together with two ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) start-up
burners, each with a maximum heat input rate of 60 MMBtu/hr.
Id. The Facility would have an electrical generation capacity of
40-MW and would be located approximately 2 km from the center
of Forestdale. Id.
Based on a 96% capacity factor, the Facility would emit the
following amounts of air pollutants (in tons per year):
 PM 2.5:63
 SO2: 45
 NOx: 110
 CO:255
 VOC: 40.
Id. However, as part of the site plan approval process for the
Village of Forestdale, the Facility’s operation is limited to no
more than 6,500 hours per year, which limits the Facility to a
capacity factor of 75%. Id. This limitation was adopted to
mitigate the impact of log trucks bringing raw logs to the Facility
for processing into pellet fuel. Id. The limitation is included in
the site plan approval and can be enforced by the building
inspector of the Village of Forestdale. Id. Based on this 75%
capacity factor, the Facility would emit the following amounts of
air pollutants (in tons per year):
 PM 2.5:47
 SO2: 32
 NOx:80
 CO:190
 VOC: 30.

5
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Id. In addition, the Facility would emit 350,000 tons per year of
greenhouse gas emissions in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e)
when operating at 96% capacity. Id.
The NAD Petition.
NUARB is authorized to issue
preconstruction permits under § 7475 of the CAA pursuant to the
EPA’s delegation of authority. Id. The entire State of New Union
is considered to be an attainment, or PSD area, under the CAA.
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (2012).
On January 15, 2013, Sylvanergy petitioned NUARB for a
NAD, which is a determination that it is not required to obtain a
PSD preconstruction permit under § 7475 of the CAA. Id.
Sylvanergy believed it did not have the potential to emit
pollutants in excess of the relevant thresholds under § 7479(1) for
two reasons. Id.
First, Sylvanergy contended it was not a “fossil-fuel fired”
source subject to the 100-ton-per year, “major emitting facility”
threshold applicable to such plants. R. at 6. Second, Sylvanergy
contended that it did not have the potential to emit more than the
otherwise-applicable threshold of 250 tons per year of regulated
pollutants. Id. In making this argument, Sylvanergy relied on
the Village of Forestdale site plan approval’s limitation on hours
of operation to reduce its potential to emit carbon monoxide below
the threshold. Id. NUARB rejected these arguments and denied
the NAD. Id. In doing so, NUARB reasoned that the Facility’s
inclusion of ULSD start-up burners made it a fossil-fuel fired
facility, and that the operating hours restriction in the site plan
was not a “federally enforceable” limitation, as required by 40
C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4), in order to reduce the Facility’s emitting
potential below the thresholds. Id.
The PSD Permit.
Sylvanergy then filed for a PSD
preconstruction permit, and NUARB published a draft of the
permit on September 12, 2013, with the relevant applicability
determination information. Id. Save Our Climate (“SOC”), a nonprofit environmental protection group, filed extensive public
comments. Id. NUARB issued the permit on June 12, 2014. Id.
NUARB approved Sylvanergy’s flue controls for particulates,
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and VOCs as
constituting Best Available Control Technology (“BACT”). Id.
These permit requirements are not being challenged. Id.
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NUARB also conducted a BACT review for GHG emissions
from the Facility, using a 96% capacity factor. Id. Sylvanergy
argued that it should be viewed as having zero GHG emissions,
but NUARB disagreed. Id. SOC filed detailed comments on the
proposed permit and argued that BACT for the GHGs emitted
from the Facility was a wood gasification and partial carbon
capture and storage plant. Id.
The BACT Analysis. NUARB then conducted what it
considered to be a top-down approach to available control
technologies for GHGs. Its analysis went as follows:
a. NUARB considered carbon capture and storage as the
technology with the greatest reduction of GHGs, but it
rejected the technology on the grounds that there was no
proven technology for removing CO2 from the dilute flue
gas streams that result from biomass combustion.
b. NUARB considered whether alternative fuels such as
natural gas or oil would lower carbon emissions for a 40MW generation facility, but it rejected this option because
it would redefine the Facility.
c. NUARB also rejected the implementation of wood
gasification and partial carbon capture stating it would
redefine the Facility.
d. NUARB then considered the implementation of a
Sustainable Forest Plan, which would require Sylvanergy
to purchase and maintain a dedicated reforestation area.
NUARB reasoned that, based on an assumed production
rate of 10 dry tons of wood per hectare per year,
acquisition of 25,000 hectares of dedicated forest land
would offset about 70% of GHG emissions and would cost
about $10 million. NUARB also maintained that this was
required by New Union Executive Order 005-12, issued by
Governor Halley Comet, on recommendation of the
Governor’s Task Force on Climate Change and
Sustainability. Under Executive Order 005-12, all state
agencies in New Union must, to the maximum extent
allowed by law, ensure that any new construction project
they undertake or approve will be carbon neutral.
R. at 6-7.
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Sylvanergy and SOC each filed timely petitions for review of
the permit with the EAB. R. at 7. The EAB determined that it
lacked jurisdiction to review NUARB’s NAD. Id. The EAB
further held that neither party’s petition for review identified a
clearly erroneous factual or legal determination that would justify
granting the petition for review. R. at 13. Accordingly, the
petitions were denied. R. at 14. Sylvanergy and SOC then filed
petitions under § 7607(b) seeking judicial review of the PSD
preconstruction permit.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Under the Clean Air Act’s judicial review statute, Sylvanergy
had 60 days from the date notice of NUARB’s denial of its request
for a NAD. Because Sylvanergy did not meet this filing deadline,
and due to the filing deadline’s jurisdictional nature, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to review NUARB’s applicability determination.
Further, even if this Court did have jurisdiction to review
NUARB’s determination, NUARB correctly determined that
Sylvanergy was a “major emitting facility” because it is a “fossilfuel fired” source due to its combustion of fossil fuels and its
potential to emit more than 100 tons per year of regulated
pollutants; additionally, there are no “federally enforceable”
limitations to bring its carbon monoxide emissions below 250 tons
per year—it is a “major emitting facility” subject to PSD review
under either category.
NUARB correctly determined that Sylvanergy is required to
undergo PSD review for GHG emissions under the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Utility Air Regulatory Group. In light of this
ruling and the EPA’s implementing regulation, major sources
that are subject to PSD review for other criteria pollutants must
also undergo PSD review for GHGs if they are expected to emit
more than a de minimis amount. Sylvanergy’s proposed facility is
expected to emit 350,000 tons per year of GHGs—well above a de
minimis rate. Because Sylvanergy was required to undergo PSD
review for its other criteria pollutant emissions, it is now required
to also undergo PSD review for GHGs.
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When regulation of GHG emitters began, the EPA published
the Deferral Rule, exempting biogenic emissions for a three-year
period. This rule, however, was vacated by the D.C. Circuit in
Center for Biological Diversity. Even if the rule had not been
vacated, it could not operate to exempt Sylvanergy’s facility
because, by the rule’s own language, it would have expired.
Accordingly, Sylvanergy would not have been exempt and would
now be subject to PSD review for GHGs.
Under PSD review, NUARB erred in its BACT analysis by
excluding wood gasification and partial carbon capture and
storage. NUARB correctly determined that the technology was
feasible in Step Two of the analysis; however, it incorrectly
eliminated the technology on the grounds that it “redefined the
source.” It has long been accepted that requiring a facility to
change its primary fuel source or to completely redesign its
facility is impermissible in determining BACT. Requiring minor
changes, however, in order to accommodate new technology is
acceptable. Partial carbon capture and storage may require
Sylvanergy to make minor modifications to the construction of the
Facility, but it still retains the fundamental purpose and fuel
source. Accordingly, it does not redefine the Facility.
NUARB further erred in its BACT analysis by failing to
consider the adverse environmental impacts of the Sustainable
Forest Plan. SOC raised significant concerns regarding the
negative environmental impacts the plan would have; however,
these comments were never addressed by NUARB. Indeed,
NUARB ignored these concerns and instead relied on an
inapplicable state-issued Executive Order to justify the plan. The
EPA’s regulations require that the permitting authority
adequately consider each concern and provide detailed analyses
for rejecting any concerns. NUARB failed to do either of these
and dismissed the issues with a conclusory statement. This
clearly violates the EPA’s regulations and warrants reversible
error. As a result, this Court should remand this case for
NUARB to conduct a correct BACT analysis as required by the
EPA.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

9
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Under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), NUARB’s decision is presumed to be valid. Sierra Club
v. Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Nevertheless, the Court “must reject agency action if it is
‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.’” Id. at 18 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(2012)). Even an agency decision of “less than ideal clarity”
should be upheld so long as “the agency’s path may reasonably be
discerned.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).

ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW
NUARB’S DENIAL OF SYLVANERGY’S REQUEST
FOR A NON-APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION
BECAUSE IT IS TIME-BARRED UNDER §
7607(B)’S 60-DAY FILING DEADLINE.

The EAB appropriately framed this Court’s jurisdiction over
Sylvanergy’s petition for review of NUARB’s applicability
determination: “Sylvanergy had the option of seeking judicial
review of the denial of the NAD, and failed to avail itself of that
option.” R. at 8 (emphasis added). Under § 7607(b), an aggrieved
party must file a petition for review within 60 days of the date on
which the EPA’s action appears in the Federal Register. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1) (2012). Moreover, because the 60-day filing deadline
in § 7607(b) is jurisdictional, it rings the death knell for
Sylvanergy’s petition for review of NUARB’s applicability
determination. Sylvanergy did not petition this Court to review
NUARB’s denial of the NAD within 60 days of its notice of the
action. Indeed, Sylvanergy waited almost a year to petition this
Court. Therefore, § 7607(b)’s 60-day filing deadline deprives this
Court of jurisdiction over Sylvanergy’s petition to review
NUARB’s denial of the NAD because it was untimely filed and is
thus time-barred.
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Sylvanergy Did Not File its Petition for Review of
NUARB’s Denial of the NAD Within 60 Days From
the Date Notice of Such Action.

Sylvanergy’s petition to review NUARB’s denial of the NAD
is late, and is therefore time-barred. The CAA provides:
[a]ny petition for review under [§ 7607(b)(1)] shall be filed within
sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or
action appears in the Federal Register, except that if such
petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day,
then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed
within sixty days after such grounds arise.

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). Clearly, the
statute establishes a filing deadline of 60 days in order to confer
jurisdiction. Sylvanergy attempts to challenge NUARB’s denial
of its request for a NAD. Sylvanergy petitioned NUARB for such
NAD on January 15, 2013. R. at 5. First, NUARB denied the
request via written notification. Next, NUARB published a draft
permit for public comment on September 12, 2013, which also
included the relevant applicability determination information. Id.
at 6. NUARB then issued the PSD permit on June 12, 2014. Id.
Under § 7607(b)’s 60-day filing deadline, Sylvanergy
therefore had, at the very latest, 60 days from June 12, 2014.1
Sylvanergy petitioned this Court well after 60 days from June 12,
2014. Indeed, the EAB order from which Sylvanergy appeals was
not issued until over a year after NUARB issued its applicability
determination. Consequently, § 7607(b)’s filing deadline deprives
this Court of jurisdiction over Sylvanergy’s petition for review of
NUARB’s denial of the NAD. See Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723
F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the court lacked

1. There is certainly an argument that the 60-day filing deadline began to
run at the time Sylvanergy either received notice of the denial by written
notification or when NUARB published the draft permit with the relevant
applicability determination information. See Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723
F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1984) (starting the clock on a company’s petition for
review of a PSD applicability determination when the company first received
notice and not when the action was published in the Federal Register). Since,
however, Sylvanergy does not meet the 60-day filing deadline from the very
latest date, June 12, 2014, the Court need not reach these arguments.
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jurisdiction to review a company’s petition to review a PSD
applicability determination because the company did not file its
petition within 60 days of notice of such determination); Puerto
Rican Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 299 (1st Cir. 1989)
(same); Utah ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Div. of Air
Quality v. EPA,750 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2014) (same);Okla.
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. EPA,740 F.3d 185, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(same).
B.

Section 7607(b)’s 60-Day Filing Deadline is
Jurisdictional in Nature and Thus Deprives this
Court of Jurisdiction Over NUARB’s Denial of the
NAD.

Admittedly, this is a bit of a vexed question due to the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Clean Water Action Council of
Northeastern Wisconsin, Inc. v. EPA, 765 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2014).
In Clean Water Action Council, the Seventh Circuit ruled, in
direct contradiction to the Tenth Circuit in Utah v. EPA,765 F.3d
1257 (10th Cir. 2014) and the D.C. Circuit in Okla. Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185 (D.C. Cir. 2014), that § 7607(b)’s 60day filing deadline is not jurisdictional. This Court, however,
should find the wealth of case law contrary to the Seventh
Circuit’s lone conclusion to this question amply persuasive, and
rule that the 60-day filing deadline in § 7607(b) is jurisdictional.
First, to sum up its rationale in holding that § 7607(b)’s filing
deadline is not jurisdictional, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Congress could have framed the filing and venue rules in
jurisdictional terms, but it did not.Section 7607(b)does not
mention jurisdiction. Nor does§ 7607(b)use language that is
traditionally understood as jurisdictional. And the Supreme
Court has not indicated that the§ 7607filing deadline is
jurisdictional. That the Council did not bring its claim within 60
days of the regulation’s publication (or in the D.C. Circuit)
therefore does not affect this court’s jurisdiction.

Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 752 (internal citations
omitted). The Tenth Circuit in Utah, however, addresses each of
these points and applies well-established precedent and sound
logic to reach a predictable conclusion: § 7607(b)’s filing deadline
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is jurisdictional. Utah, 765 F.3d at 1262 (“Accordingly, we adhere
to the conclusion stated in our panel opinion: The 60–day
deadline in§ 7607(b)(1)is jurisdictional, and we lack jurisdiction
over the petitions because PacifiCorp and Utah filed their
petitions late.”); see also Okla. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at
191 (reaching the same conclusion as the Tenth Circuit in Utah).
Beginning with first principles, filing deadlines can be
jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional, and in deciding which
deadlines are jurisdictional, the court must apply a “bright-line”
rule. See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824
(2013). This rule focuses on Congress’s stated intention. Id.
When Congress clearly states that a deadline is jurisdictional, the
court must regard it as jurisdictional.Id. To make its intention
“clear,” however, Congress need not use any particular words. Id.
Thus, in determining whether Congress has spoken clearly, the
court must focus on the legal character of the deadline, as shown
through its text, context, and historical treatment. Utah, 765 F.3d
at 1258 (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick,559 U.S. 154, 166
(2010)).
The text of § 7607(b) uses jurisdictional terminology: “shall”
and “petition for review.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012); see
Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 825–26, (stating that the
words “shall” and “notice of appeal” carry “jurisdictional import”
in connection with the statutory deadline for appeals from district
courts). This “statutory language reflects Congress’s explicit
recognition that the 60-day deadline is jurisdictional.” Utah, 765
F.3d at 1260.
Much like the statutory text, the context of § 7607(b) also
leads to the only logical conclusion here: it is jurisdictional.
Section 7607(b) not only supplies a deadline, but also serves as
the jurisdictional basis for petitions like the present one. See
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593 (1980) (stating
that “Congress . . . vested the courts of appeals with jurisdiction
under [§ 7607(b)(1)].”). Further, without § 7607(b)(1), this Court
would lack jurisdiction over any petition under the CAA because
the federal government would enjoy sovereign immunity in suits
against the EPA. See Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 901
(9th Cir. 2001) (“Suits against the EPA, as against any agency of
the United States, are barred by sovereign immunity, unless

13
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there has been a specific waiver of that immunity.”); see
also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (stating that
sovereign immunity shields federal agencies from suit). Thus,
Congress
waived
sovereign
immunity
through §
7607(b)(1). See Royster–Clark Agribusiness, Inc. v. Johnson, 391
F. Supp. 2d 21, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2005).
Though § 7607(b)(1) waives sovereign immunity, the waiver
contains limitations, including the 60–day deadline. Through
this deadline, § 7607(b)(1) serves a jurisdictional function by
restricting
the
congressional
waiver
of
sovereign
immunity. See Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch.
Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) (“When waiver legislation
contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision
constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.”).
This jurisdictional function connotes that the 60–day deadline is
itself jurisdictional. See Miller v. FDIC, 738 F.3d 836, 845-46 (7th
Cir. 2013); see also United States v. McGaughy, 670 F.3d 1149,
1156 (10th Cir. 2012).
Finally, not only does the statutory text of § 7607(b) and its
context firmly support the argument that the 60-day filing
deadline is jurisdictional, the historical treatment of the provision
wrings out the last drops of the Seventh Circuit’s argument to the
contrary in Clean Water Council. For example, filing deadlines
have long been considered jurisdictional when they involve
appeals to Article III courts. See Utah, 765 F.3d at 1261 (“Section
7607(b)(1), governing appeals to article III courts, illustrates the
type of deadline long-considered jurisdictional.”); United States v.
McGaughy, 670 F.3d at 1156 (“Historically, certain types of
restrictions have long been held to be jurisdictional—the epitome
of these are time restrictions for taking an appeal.”); see
also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 n.2 (2007) (“[I]t is
indisputable that time limits for filing a notice of appeal have
been treated as jurisdictional in American law for well over a
century.”).
If this Court were to rule that § 7607’s 60-day filing deadline
is not jurisdictional, thus conferring jurisdiction over
Sylvanergy’s untimely petition for review of NUARB’s
applicability determination, it would not only cut against wellestablished precedent and Congressional intent, it would
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effectively bleed the filing deadline of all meaning and bless
untimely petitions to the courts of appeal. Thus, § 7607(b)(1)’s
60-day filing deadline applies and is jurisdictional, depriving this
Court of jurisdiction over Sylvanergy’s untimely petition for
review of NUARB’s denial of the NAD.
C.

The “Grounds Arising After” Exception for §
7607(b)’s 60-Day Filing Deadline and the
“Reopener Doctrine” Do Not Excuse Sylvanergy’s
Untimely Petition.

Section 7607(b) provides a limited exception to its 60-day
filing deadline, which allows for parties to file a petition after the
60-day deadline if that petition is based “solely on grounds
arising after such sixtieth day.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012).
Unfortunately for Sylvanergy, “better late than never” is not
sufficient grounds to file an untimely petition here. Further, the
“Reopener Doctrine” does little more to cure Sylvanergy’s
jurisdictional defect. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
review NUARB’s denial of the NAD.
Courts have interpreted the “grounds arising after” language,
as it appears in the CAA and in the judicial review provisions of
other statutes, as granting a new filing period where a
petitioner's claims were not ripe at the time of the original
action. See, e.g., Am. Road & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA, 705
F.3d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)
(2012)); Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. EPA, 665 F.2d
1284, 1289-90 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the legislative history
of § 7607(b)(1), indicates that the exception was intended for
circumstances where “significant new information has become
available”); Petro-Chem. Processing, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.2d 433,
437 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that RCRA’s identical language
“does not apply in these cases, in which the substantive grounds
for the petitions arose, if at all, before the time limit expired.”).
Here, Sylvanergy’s claims were ripe during the original filing
period, and no intervening events gave rise to new claims
addressed in these petitions.
Similarly, this Court would not have jurisdiction under the
“Reopener Doctrine,” which is limited to cases where an agency
explicitly or implicitly reopens the substance of the action and
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“demonstrates that the agency ‘ha[s] undertaken a serious,
substantive reconsideration of the [existing] rule.’” P & V Enters.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 516 F.3d 1021, 1023-26 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (quoting Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 70 F.3d
1345, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1995)); see also Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting
that “reopener” challenges are unavailable where an agency has
“merely republished an existing rule in order to propose minor
changes to it.”); see also Utah ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality,
Div. of Air Quality v. EPA, 750 F.3d 1182, 1185-86 (10th Cir.
2014) (declining to adopt the “Reopener Doctrine” but stating that
it would not apply to the EPA’s changing of a published filing
deadline). Here, no event—including the appeal to the EAB and
its subsequent order—demonstrated any intent on EPA’s part to
undertake a “substantive reconsideration” of the applicability
determination. R. at 8.
Sylvanergy did not file its petition for review of NUARB’s
applicability determination within 60 days of date notice of the
action. Therefore, under § 7607(b)’s 60-day filing deadline, that
petition now carries a jurisdictional defect and jurisdictional
defects are fatal. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to review
Sylvanergy’s untimely petition for review of NUARB’s
applicability determination.
II. EVEN IF THIS COURT DID HAVE JURISDICTION

TO REVIEW NUARB’S DENIAL OF
SYLVANERGY’S REQUEST FOR A NONAPPLICABILITY DETERMINATION, NUARB
PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE
SYLVANERGY FACILITY IS A “MAJOR EMITTING
FACILITY” SUBJECT TO PSD REVIEW.

Even if this Court did have jurisdiction to review NUARB’s
applicability determination, Sylvanergy is still subject to PSD
review because NUARB properly determined that the Sylvanergy
facility is a “major emitting facility.”
NUARB reasonably
interpreted Clean Air Act statutes and its implementing
regulations in determining that the Sylvanergy facility is a
“fossil-fuel fired” source. Even if it was not, the Facility has the
potential to emit more than 250 tons per year of carbon
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monoxide—either way, the Facility is a “major emitting facility”
subject to PSD review.
Thus, because Sylvanergy cannot
demonstrate that NUARB’s determination was “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law,” this Court must uphold NUARB’s determinations. 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (“Although this inquiry
into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate
standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”).
A.

The Sylvanergy Facility is a “Fossil-Fuel Fired”
Source Subject to the 100 Ton-Per-Year Threshold
Under § 7479(1) of the Clean Air Act.

The PSD requirements under the Clean Air Act apply to the
construction of any new “major emitting facility.” 42 U.S.C. §
7479 (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2) (2015). A facility is a “major
emitting facility” if it falls within one of the twenty-six listed
categories of sources—one of which being “[f]ossil fuel-fired steam
electric plants of more than 250 million British thermal units per
hour heat input”—and emits or has the potential to emit one
hundred tons or more of any regulated pollutant per year. Id.
The law also considers a facility not among the listed categories
as a major emitting facility if it emits, or has the potential to
emit, 250 tons per year or more of any regulated pollutant. Id.
Accordingly, since NUARB correctly determined that the
Sylvanergy facility was a “fossil-fuel fired” source subject to the
100-ton-per-year threshold, it is a “major emitting facility” subject
to PSD review.
Although the Clean Air Act does not expressly define “fossilfuel fired” under its PSD provisions, it does however, define it
under its New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”);
specifically, subpart D entitled “Standards of Performance for
Fossil-Fuel-Fired Steam Generators.” There, the EPA defines a
“fossil-fuel-fired steam generation unit” as a “furnace or boiler
used in the process of burning fossil fuel for the purpose of
producing steam by heat transfer.” 40 C.F.R. § 60.41 (2015).
Applying this definition, the Sylvanergy facility is a “fossilfuel fired” source subject to the 100-ton-per-year threshold in the
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“major emitting facility” definition. The Facility would house a
500 million Btu/hour electricity generation unit capable of 40-MW
of electrical generation. R. at 5. The facility will also consist of
“two ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) start-up burners, each with a
maximum heat input rate of 60 MMBtu/hr.” Id. Further, the
Facility will emit 110 tons of NOx per year and 255 tons of CO
per year. Id. An application of the facts to a literal reading of the
CAA definition therefore renders NUARB’s determination more
than reasonable, and certainly not “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2012). The Sylvanergy facility is a clearly a
“furnace or boiler used in the process of burning fossil fuel for the
purpose of producing steam by heat transfer.”
Furthermore, NUARB’s determination is consistent with the
Clean Air Act. Two other programs under the Act define “fossilfuel fired” in harmony with NUARB’s determination here. To
illustrate, the CAA’s “Acid Rain Program” defines “fossil-fuel
fired” as “the combustion of fossil fuel or any derivative of fossil
fuel, alone or in combination with any other fuel, independent of
the percentage of fossil fuel consumed in any calendar year
(expressed in mmBtu).” 40 C.F.R. § 72.2 (2015). Similarly, the
CAA’s “Cross-State Air Pollution Rule” defines a “fossil-fuel fired”
unit as one that “combusts any amount of fossil fuel in 2005 or
later.” Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of
Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP
Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,207 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97). The common “fossil-fuel fired”
denominator in the CAA: combustion of fossil fuel. Here,
NUARB’s determination that Sylvanergy’s sulfur diesel burners
subject it to the 100-ton-per-year “major emitting” threshold is
consistent with the Act and is certainly not “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
Consequently,
this Court must
uphold NUARB’s
determination that the Sylvanergy facility is a “fossil-fuel fired”
source subject to the 100-ton-per-year “major emitting facility”
threshold, and is thus subject to PSD review.
B.

Because the Restriction on Operating Hours in the
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Village of Forestdale’s Site Plan Approval is Not a
“Federally Enforceable” Limitation, the
Sylvanergy Facility has the “Potential to Emit”
More than 250 Tons Per Year of Carbon Monoxide.
Even if the Sylvanergy facility were not a “fossil-fuel fired”
source, it would nevertheless be subject to PSD review because it
has the “potential to emit [250] tons per year or more of any air
pollutant.” 42 U.S.C. § 7479 (2012) (defining “major emitting
facility”). Based on a 96% capacity factor, the Sylvanergy facility
would emit 255 tons per year of carbon monoxide, putting it
squarely within the definition of a “major emitting facility.” R. at
5. Sylvanergy would contend, however, that the limitation on its
operating hours, present in the Village of Forestdale’s site plan
approval, is a federally enforceable limitation limiting its capacity
factor to 75%. This in turn would limit its carbon monoxide
emission to 190 tons per year, and it therefore would not have the
“potential to emit” 250 tons per year. R. at 5-6. NUARB correctly
determined, however, that the limitation on operating hours in
the Village of Forestdale’s site plan approval is not a “federally
enforceable” limitation. R. at 5. Consequently, Sylvanergy is—yet
again—a “major emitting facility” subject to PSD review.
The “potential to emit” means:
the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant
under its physical and operational design. Any physical or
operational limitation on the capacity of the source to emit a
pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of
material combusted, stored, or processed, shall be treated as part
of its design if the limitation or the effect it would have on
emissions is federally enforceable.

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4) (2015) (emphasis added). So, although a
restriction on operating hours is expressly listed in the definition
of “potential to emit” as a limiting factor in a source’s design, such
restriction must still be “federally enforceable.”
In turn, the term “federally enforceable” means “‘legally and
practicably enforceable by a state or local air pollution control
agency.’” Weiler v. Chatham Forest Prods., Inc., 392 F.3d 532, 535
(2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting EPA Interim Policy on
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Federal Enforceability of Limitations on Potential to Emit, at 3-4
(Jan. 22, 1996)); see also 40 C.F.R. § 51.166 (2015) (emphasis
added) (defining “federally enforceable” as “all limitations and
conditions which are enforceable by the Administrator”).
Accordingly, a proposed facility that is physically capable of
emitting major levels of the relevant pollutants is to be
considered a “major emitting facility” under the CAA unless there
are legally and practicably enforceable mechanisms in place that
are enforceable by a state or local air pollution control agency.
The limitation on hours of operation at issue was adopted in
order to mitigate the impact of log trucks bringing raw logs to the
Facility, and would bring the operating hours of the Facility to
6,500 per year. R. at 5. Crucially though, the limitation is
“enforced by the building inspector of the Village of Forestdale.”
Id.
This limitation is therefore far from being “federally
enforceable.” Indeed, the state and local air pollution agencies
may not even enforce this limitation. Much like NUARB’s
determination that the Sylvanergy facility is a “fossil-fuel fired”
source, the applicable definitions here foreclose Sylvanergy’s
arguments to the contrary: NUARB’s determination is more than
reasonable, and certainly not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §
706 (2012).
This Court therefore must uphold NUARB’s
determination that the hours-of-operation-limitation in the
Village of Forestdale’s site plane approval is not a “federally
enforceable” limitation bringing Sylvanergy’s carbon monoxide
emissions below 250 tons per year. The Sylvanergy facility is
thus a “major emitting facility” subject to PSD review.
This Court should not—indeed cannot—disturb NUARB’s
determinations. Awash with reasonableness and sound logic,
NUARB’s determinations were grounded in applicable statutes
and were certainly not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” As a result,
this Court must uphold NUARB’s determinations and rule that
the Sylvanergy facility is a “major emitting facility” subject to
PSD review.
III. THE SYLVANERGY FACILITY IS SUBJECT TO
PSD REVIEW FOR GHGS BECAUSE IT IS AN
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“ANYWAY SOURCE” EMITTING MORE THAN A
DE MINIMIS AMOUNT OF GHGS.
The Supreme Court and the EPA have recently resolved a
previously unsettled issue: whether GHGs are subject to
regulation under the CAA. They are. Under the PSD permitting
program, sources that meet certain thresholds must be “subject to
the best available control technology for each pollutant subject to
regulation” under the CAA. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012)
(emphasis added). GHGs are now treated as pollutants “subject
to regulation” when they are emitted from facilities that must
also obtain a PSD permit “anyway” due to their emission of other
pollutants. Utility Air Regulatory Grp. (UARG) v. EPA, 134 S. Ct.
2427, 2447-49 (2014). In ruling that GHGs are now subject to
PSD review, the Supreme Court first tracked the law’s recent
evolution. Id.
In 2009, EPA published its finding that GHGs endanger both
public health and welfare and that the combined emissions of
these GHGs from new motor vehicles cause and contribute to air
pollution that endangers public health and welfare.
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg.
66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). The
regulation of GHGs in the motor vehicle industry posited the
question of whether GHGs would now be regulated under PSD
review.
In 2011, the EPA answered this question in the
affirmative.
Motor vehicle GHG standards also trigger
permitting requirements under the CAA. Reconsideration of
Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr.
2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 50, 51, 70, 71).
The EPA decided regulating all facilities that release GHGs
under the PSD program would be nearly impossible, so it issued a
rule to temper the scope of the regulation: the “Tailoring Rule.”
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse
Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,523 (June 3, 2010) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). Step One of the
Tailoring Rule began on January 2, 2011, and ended on June 30,
2011. Id. This step covers what EPA deems “anyway sources”—
that is, facilities that would be subject to PSD review for GHGs if
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they were subject to PSD review “anyway” based on emissions of
pollutants other than GHGs. Id. Step Two began on July 1, 2011,
and continued thereafter to cover both “anyway sources”
releasing at least 75,000 tons per year of CO2e and to other large
emitters of GHGs. Id. at 31,523.
The EPA also attempted to narrow the scope of GHG
regulation by exempting certain biogenic carbon emissions in the
“Deferral Rule.” Deferral for CO2 Emissions From Bioenergy and
Other Biogenic Sources Under the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) and Title V Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490
(July 20, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
The Deferral Rule exempts from regulation, for a period of three
years, biogenic carbon dioxide sources that trigger PSD and Title
V permitting. Id. at 43,493. In promulgating this rule, EPA cited
its ongoing efforts to understand the unique characteristics of
biogenic carbon dioxide and how it should be regulated. Id. at
15,251. The Deferral Rule also contains a provision stating that
absent agency action, on July 21, 2014, biogenic carbon dioxide
will be regulated under PSD and Title V programs, as modified by
the Tailoring Rule. Id. at 43,507.
The Deferral Rule was challenged on the grounds that the
plain language of the CAA requires that GHGs be subject to PSD
review because of the statutory definition of “major emitting
facility.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 409
(D.C. Cir. 2013); 42 U.S.C. § 7479 (2012) (a “major emitting
facility” is any “stationary sources[]” that “emit[s], or ha[s] the
potential to emit,” certain specified amounts of “any air
pollutant”). The court agreed with the petitioners that the EPA’s
rule was arbitrary and capricious because there was no
documented rationale in how the EPA determined which sources
to exempt from regulation. Id. at 411. Accordingly, the court
vacated the Deferral Rule. Id. at 412. As a result of the Deferral
Rule being vacated, biogenic facilities subject to PSD review for
other pollutants are also subject to PSD review for GHGs. In re
Energy Answers Arecibo, LLC, PSD Appeal Nos. 13-05 though 1309, slip op. (EAB Mar. 25, 2014) (remanding a permit for PSD
review for GHGs after the Deferral Rule was vacated).
In 2014, the Supreme Court reviewed this evolution of GHG
regulation and answered the question of “whether it was
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permissible for the EPA to determine that its motor-vehicle
[GHG]
regulations
automatically
triggered
permitting
requirements under the Act for stationary sources that emit
[GHGs].” UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2434. Put simply, the Court
answered the question affirmatively—with some limitations. Id.
at 2447.
The Court held that it was impermissible for the EPA to
require PSD review for facilities’ GHG emissions solely based on
their GHG emissions. Id. The Court, however, stated that the
EPA’s decision to regulate GHGs from “anyway sources” was
permissible, so long as they emit more than a de minimis amount.
Id. at 2448. The Court did not indicate what would rise above a
de minimis amount, but did state that the 75,000 tons-per-year
threshold in the Tailoring Rule may be an indicator. Id. at 2448.
In response, the EPA amended its PSD program to effectively
uphold the regulation of GHGs under PSD review for “anyway
sources.” Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V
Permitting for Greenhouse Gases: Removal of Certain Vacated
Elements, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,199, 50,200 (Aug. 19, 2015) (codified at
40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(48)(iv) (2015)).
A.

Sylvanergy’s Proposed Facility is Subject to PSD
Review for GHG Emissions Under the UARG
Decision Because It is an “Anyway Source”
Subject to PSD Review for the Emission of Other
Pollutants and Emits GHGs Above a de minimis
Level.

Sylvanergy is subject to PSD review for GHGs under the
Supreme Court’s ruling in UARG because it is subject to PSD
review “anyway” for other pollutants. Sylvanergy underwent
PSD review for particulates, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and
carbon monoxide. R. 6. As a result, it is an “anyway source”
because it is subject to PSD review anyway for other regulated
pollutants. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448. Additionally, it emits
GHGs above a de minimis level. Although the EPA has not yet
set a true de minimis level, the Supreme Court intimated that the
Tailoring Rule’s 75,000 tons per year should be instructive. Id. at
2448. Guided by the Court’s language, a facility that will emit
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350,000 tons per year of carbon dioxide equivalents would
certainly be more than a de minimis emitter. R. at 5.
Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the UARG decision was
rendered after Sylvanergy’s permit process began. “The Clean
Air Act unambiguously requires [a facility] to demonstrate that
[it] complies with the regulations in effect at the time the [p]ermit
is issued.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 762 F.3d 971, 973-74 (9th Cir.
2014) (remanding a permit for PSD review of GHGs because the
regulation of GHGs under the PSD program began while the
facility’s permit was being judicially reviewed). Accordingly, even
though Sylvanergy began its permitting process before the UARG
decision, its permit must reflect the regulations as amended by
the decision.
B.

Sylvanergy’s Proposed Facility is Not Exempt
from PSD Review for GHGs Under the Deferral
Rule Because the Rule was Vacated and has
Otherwise Expired.

The Deferral Rule exempts biogenic carbon dioxide sources
from triggering PSD and Title V permitting requirements for a
period of three years. 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,493. Sylvanergy falls
into such category because it would release biogenic carbon
dioxide at a rate of 350,000 tons per year of carbon dioxide
equivalents. R. at 5. The Deferral Rule, however, was vacated
upon review in the D.C. Circuit. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722
F.3d at 412. Therefore, such exemption does not apply.
Even if the rule were not vacated, the rule itself states that it
expired on July 21, 2014. 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,507. Moreover, it is
irrelevant that the rule was still in effect at the time NUARB
published Sylvanergy’s draft permit.
Similarly, in Energy
Answers Arecibo, the Deferral Rule was still effective at the time
the draft permit was being reviewed; however, when the permit
was in front of the EAB, the Deferral Rule had been vacated. PSD
Appeal Nos. 13-05 though 13-09, slip op. at 29. The Board
remanded the case with an order to conduct PSD review for
GHGs because the permit was no longer in compliance with the
current law. Id. at 29, 30. Likewise, the EAB here appropriately
recognized that Sylvanergy is not exempt from PSD review for
GHGs because that exemption expired. R. at 6.
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The EAB correctly determined that Sylvanergy is subject to
PSD review for GHGs because it is an “anyway source” that
releases GHGs above a de minimis level. Further, it is not
exempt under the Deferral Rule because it has been vacated and
otherwise is expired.
IV. NUARB IMPROPERLY REJECTED
CONSIDERATION OF A WOOD GASIFICATION
AND PARTIAL CARBON CAPTURE AND
STORAGE PLANT AS BACT FOR SYLVANERGY
BECAUSE IT IS TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE AND
DOES NOT REDEFINE THE SOURCE.
Any major stationary source, including a bioenergy facility,
that is required to obtain a PSD permit must address the BACT
requirement for GHGs if it is subject to PSD review for other
pollutants and emits GHGs above a de minimis level. UARG, 134
S. Ct. at 2448; 40 C.F.R. § 52.166(b)(48) (2015). BACT means:
an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this
chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting
facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts
and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through
application of production processes and available methods,
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or
treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of
each such pollutant.

42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012).
To determine BACT, the EPA recommends following its 5step process, known as the “top-down” method. U.S. EPA Office of
Air Quality Planning & Standards, New Source Review Workshop
Manual at B.2 (Oct. 1990) (Draft) [“NSR Manual”]. This same
top-down method should be followed when conducting a BACT
analysis for GHG emissions. U.S. EPA Office of Air Quality
Planning & Standards, PSD and Title V Permitting Guidance for
Greenhouse Gases at 17 (Mar. 2011).
Though the NSR Manual’s top-down analysis is not
mandatory, a careful and detailed analysis of the criteria
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identified in the regulatory definition is nevertheless required;
the methodology in the NSR Manual provides a framework that
assures adequate consideration of the regulatory criteria and
consistency within the PSD permitting program. In re Cardinal
FG Co., 12 E.A.D. 153, 162 (EAB 2005). Consequently, if the
required criteria are not considered, the case will be remanded
with instructions to follow the top-down method. In re Knauf
Fiber Glass, 8 E.A.D. 121 (EAB 1999).
A.

NUARB Should Have Followed the 5-step BACT
Analysis Recommended by the EPA.

1. Step One of the BACT analysis is to identify all “potentially
available” control technologies. NSR Manual at B.5.
2. In Step Two, control technologies are eliminated if they are
“technically infeasible.” Id. at B.7.
a. A control technology is presumed to be feasible if it is
“demonstrated.” In re Cardinal FG Co., 12 E.A.D. at 162.
In turn, a control technology is demonstrated if it has been
installed and operated successfully elsewhere on a similar
facility. Id. (citing NSR Manual at B.17).
b. A control technology is also considered feasible under Step
Two if it is both “available” and “applicable.” Id.
Technology is considered available if it “can be obtained by
the applicant through commercial channels or is otherwise
available within the common sense meaning of the term.”
Id. An available technology is applicable if it “can
reasonably be installed and operated on the source type
under consideration.” Id. Conversely, “technologies in the
pilot scale testing stages of development would not be
considered available for BACT review.” Id.
c. In Step Two, a permitting authority’s decision to eliminate
potential control options as a matter of technical
infeasibility must be adequately explained and justified.
In re Steel Dynamics, 9 E.A.D. 165, 192 (EAB 2000)
(“cursory, conclusory, speculative, and unsubstantiated
opinion[s]” were not sufficient). Where a more stringent
technology is not evaluated as BACT because the
permitting authority erred in not identifying it as an
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“available” option, a remand is appropriate. In re Cardinal
FG Co., 12 E.A.D. at 168.
3. In Step Three, the remaining control technologies are ranked
in order of overall control effectiveness. NSR Manual at B.8.
4. In Step Four, the applicant considers energy, environmental,
and economic impacts of each control technology. Id. If a
control technology is eliminated at this step, the rationale
should be documented for public record. Id. at B.9.
5. Finally, in Step Five, the most effective control option that
has not been eliminated yet is selected as BACT for the
pollutant and emission unit under review. Id.
In selecting BACT, the EPA normally does not require that
the facility change the fundamental scope of the plant proposed
by the permit applicant—known as redefining the source. Sierra
Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653, 654 (7th Cir. 2007); NSR Manual at
B.13. For example, requiring a coal-fired plant to use nuclear
fuel would require redesign from the ground up. Id. However,
“pollution controls that retain the facility’s fundamental product
or purpose do not ‘redefine the source,’ regardless of whether they
require modification of the permit-applicant’s preferred design.”
In re Prairie State Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. 1, 20 (EAB 2006)
(emphasis added).
In determining whether technology impermissibly redefines
the source, the facility’s fundamental product or purpose is
determined by examining the proposed facility’s application. Id.
at 22. The purpose should be objective and must focus on the
overall business purpose for the proposed facility. Utah Chapter
of the Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 226 P.3d 719, 732 (Utah
2009). Permitting authorities should be “wary of the risk of
applicants describing a project in such a limited manner that they
are able to circumvent the goals of BACT, which include
encouraging the use of new technologies.” Id.
Here, NUARB correctly determined that a wood gasification
and partial carbon capture and storage plant is technically
feasible, but it erred in its BACT analysis by failing to follow the
top-down method and by incorrectly determining that the storage
plant would redefine the source. NUARB’s shortcomings make
its decision arbitrary and capricious, warranting reversal of the
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decision below and remand of the permit for a complete, correct
BACT analysis.
B.

NUARB Correctly Determined that Wood
Gasification and Partial Carbon Capture and
Storage is Technically Feasible Because it has Not
Only Been Demonstrated but it is also Available
and Applicable.

NUARB correctly determined that the implementation of a
wood gasification and partial carbon capture and storage is
technically feasible. R. at 13. The technology is feasible because
it is not only demonstrated but is also available and applicable.
The technology is demonstrated because it is being used at the
Decatur Carbon Sequestration Demonstration facility. R. at 12. A
control technology is demonstrated if it has been installed and
operated successfully elsewhere on a similar facility. NSR
Manual at B.17. The Decatur facility is “very similar” to the
facility proposed by Sylvanergy. Id. Furthermore, the proposed
facility is located over a geological shale formation in Forestdale
that is an “ideal location” for a carbon capture and storage
facility: much like the Decatur facility. Id. So, because of the
Decatur facility’s successful implementation of a partial carbon
capture and storage facility, this technology is a demonstrated
control technology for the Sylvanergy facility.
Additionally, partial carbon capture and storage is
technically feasible because it is both available and applicable.
Partial carbon capture and storage is commercially available, as
proven by its usage at the Decatur plant. R. at 12. The storage
plant is also applicable to Sylvanergy’s proposed facility because
it has been used on a similar facility—the Decatur facility. Id.
The Rhodes and Keith study also supports the proposition that
partial carbon capture and storage is feasible by using
technologies already in use. Id; J.S. Rhodes and D.W. Keith,
Engineering Economic Analysis of Biomass IGCC with Carbon
Capture and Storage, 29 BIOMASS AND BIOENERGY 440, 441
(2005) (“Only biomass-CCS can both provide low-carbon energy
products and effectively remove carbon from the natural carbon
cycle.”). The wood gasification and partial carbon capture and
storage plant would therefore not only be potentially available
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under Step One but also technically feasible under Step Two of
the BACT analysis.
C.

NUARB Incorrectly Determined that Wood
Gasification and Partial Carbon Capture and
Storage Would Redefine the Source Because it
Would Not Change the Fundamental Product and
Purpose of the Facility.

NUARB agreed with the factual propositions supporting the
use of partial carbon capture and storage, but it incorrectly
determined that the partial carbon capture and storage facility
was inappropriate as BACT because it redefines the Facility. R.
at 12. Sylvanergy proposed to burn fossil fuel and wood to
generate electricity. R. at 13. Its proposed product and purpose
are wood and the generation of electricity. Implementing the
wood gasification and partial carbon capture and storage plant
would advance the Facility’s fundamental purpose: the
generation of electricity. Implementing the wood gasification and
partial carbon capture and storage plant would maintain the
Facility’s fundamental product: wood.
The only minor
modification the Facility would be subject to is gasifying the
wood. The source is not redefined. See In re Prairie State
Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. at 20 (holding that “pollution controls
that retain the facility’s fundamental product or purpose do not
‘redefine the source,’ regardless of whether they require
modification of the permit-applicant’s preferred design”); Sierra
Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d at 654 (holding that a BACT requirement
on a coal-fired facility to rebuild the facility from the ground up to
utilize nuclear fuel was redefining the source).
Also, this Court can not allow Sylvanergy to describe its
project in such a limited way as to circumvent the goals of BACT.
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, 226 P.3d at 732 (cautioning that
permitting authorities should be “wary of the risk of applicants
describing a project in such a limited manner that they are able
to circumvent the goals of BACT, which include encouraging the
use of new technologies”). The fundamental purpose underlying
BACT is to compel “rapid adoption of improvements in technology
as new sources are built.” S. Rep. No. 95-127, at 29 (1977). As
wood gasification and partial carbon capture and storage is
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quickly becoming the standard as BACT for facilities, NUARB
should not have been eliminated it. See Margaret E. Peloso and
Matthew Dobbins, Greenhouse Gas PSD Permitting: The Year in
Review, 42 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 245 (2012). Accordingly, it is
becoming “more difficult for future applicants to dismiss CCS
[carbon capture and storage] . . . as BACT.” Id. at 253. As such, it
should not have been excluded from the BACT analysis in Step
Two.
Therefore, in Step Three, the remaining technologies should
have been ranked by their control effectiveness. In other words,
the Sustainable Forest Plan would be ranked first, and wood
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage would have
been ranked second.
IV. NUARB FURTHER ERRED IN ITS BACT
ANALYSIS BY IMPERMISSIBLY IMPOSING THE
SUSTAINABLE FOREST PLAN AS BACT FOR THE
PROPOSED SYLVANERGY FACILITY BECAUSE
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ITS ADVERSE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS.
Under Step Four of the BACT analysis, control technologies
are to be eliminated if they have any significant or unusual
environmental impacts. NSR Manual at B.47. This analysis
should be conducted based on a consideration of site-specific
circumstances and should be performed for the entire hierarchy of
technologies. Id. First, the permitting authority performs a
qualitative or semi-qualitative screening to narrow the analysis
to discharges with potential for causing adverse environmental
effects. NSR Manual at B.48. Then the mass composition of any
such discharges are assessed and quantified to the extent
possible, based on readily available information. Id. After
reviewing this information, the adverse environmental effects of a
technology may result in the top-control-option being elimination.
NSR Manual at B.8-9.
The permit issuer must give reasonable consideration to
allegations of adverse environmental impacts and must fully and
meaningfully respond to any related public comments. In re Old
Dominion, 1992 EPA App. LEXIS 37, at *10 (EAB Jan. 29, 1992);
see also 40 C.F.R. § 124.17(a)(2) (2015) (permitting agencies must
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“briefly describe and respond to all significant comments on the
draft permit”).
It is permissible to dismiss allegations of
environmental impacts where such allegations are unsupported
by evidence. In re Old Dominion, 1992 EPA App. LEXIS at *14.
Otherwise, each allegation requires a response. These responses
should not be conclusory; rather, they should provide references
and detailed analyses for why the permitting authority responded
to the allegations of adverse impacts the way it did. In re IndeckElwood, LLC, 13 E.A.D. 126, 154 (EAB 2006). Where the
permitting authority’s rationale is not clear, its responses do not
reflect careful consideration. In re Knauf Fiber Glass, 8 E.A.D. at
132. And where responses do not reflect careful consideration,
the permitting authority has committed clear error. Id.
To illustrate, in Indeck-Elwood, LLC, the permitting
authority, without citing sufficient evidence for its reasoning,
simply stated that a technology would have no adverse
environmental impacts. Id. The permitting authority’s decisions
were in error because they were “largely conclusory and [did] not
provide or reference any more detailed analyses that support[ed]
its conclusions.” Id. Conversely, the permitting authority’s
reasoning is sufficiently supported when it relies on evidence to
state that a technology would not have significant adverse
environmental impacts. In re Prairie State Generating Co., 13
E.A.D. at 46 (relying on a biological opinion that there would be
no significant environmental impact).
A.

NUARB Acted Arbitrarily in Step Four of its BACT
Analysis by Failing to Adequately Consider
Comments Raised by SOC and by Instead Relying
on an Inapplicable State-Issued Executive Order.

Here, NUARB’s failure to adequately address the adverse
environmental impacts of the Sustainable Forest Plan constitutes
clear error. SOC submitted “extensive comments and ecological
studies” to support its argument that monoculture forestry
practices, such as the Sustainable Forest Plan, destroy
biodiversity and promote tree diseases and pest infestations. R. at
12. NUARB did not address these comments. R. at 12. NUARB’s
failure violates the regulatory requirement to “briefly describe
and respond to all significant comments on the draft permit,” 40
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C.F.R. § 124.17(a)(2) (2015). NUARB’s decision was therefore
arbitrary and capricious.
NUARB also impermissibly relied on Governor Comet’s
Executive Order 005-12 in justifying its decision to impose the
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT. R. at 7. Executive Order 00512 requires that “all State agencies in New Union must, to the
extent allowed by law, ensure that any new construction project
they undertake or approve will be carbon neutral.” Id. Because
the Executive Order is inapplicable here, NUARB’s reliance on it
was in error. First, the Executive Order applies only to “State
agencies.” Id.
NUARB, however, operates under delegated
authority from the EPA, so it truly functions as a federal agency.
R. at 5; In re Knauf Fiber Glass, 8 E.A.D. at 174 (agencies
operating under delegating authority are federal agencies).
Therefore, the NUARB does not fall within the scope of the
Executive Order.
Additionally, the Executive Order should only be complied
with “to the extent allowed by law.” R. at 7. Therefore, the CAA
statutory scheme and principles governing the BACT analysis
should govern. In re Sierra Pac. Indus., PSD Appeal Nos. 13-01
through 13-04, slip op. at 31 (EAB July 18, 2013) (“Neither [an]
Executive Order nor EPA policy statements, however, amend
EPA’s statutory or regulatory requirements and obligations.”). As
required by the CAA and the NSR Manual, NUARB must
consider adverse environmental impacts and make changes
accordingly in its selection of BACT. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012)
(emphasis added); NSR Manual at B.48. This consideration is so
important that the permitting authority should select a slightly
less effective control technology if a more effective control
technology has significant adverse environmental impacts. Mont.
Env’t Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t Envtl. Quality, 2004 ML 682, 2004
Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3151, at *37 (Mont., Mar. 30, 2004).
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Under Step Four of its BACT analysis, NUARB
Should Have Determined that Partial Carbon
Capture and Storage is BACT Because of the
Sustainable Forest Plan’s Significant Adverse
Environmental Impacts.

Step Four of the BACT analysis requires the permitting
authority to consider economic impacts of the remaining
technologies in addition to their environmental impacts. In
weighing the costs of the two competing technologies, partial
carbon capture and storage is admittedly not the cheapest. This
is not unusual however, in the regulation of facilities. Indeed, the
EPA has acknowledged that “present add-on controls for CO2 are
generally not cheap.” U.S. EPA Office of Air and Radiation,
Guidance for Determining Best Available Control Technology for
Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Bioenergy Production
at 24 (Mar. 2011). However, the permitting authority does not
have the discretion to eliminate a technology merely because it is
expensive. It only has the authority to consider the economic
impact of a technology in comparison to its effectiveness and its
environmental impacts. Id. at 17.
Here, the cost of partial carbon capture and storage is a
nonstarter for three reasons. First, Sylvanergy made no objection
to the technology based on its costs, and the impacts considered
in Step Four are evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Id. In this
case, the argument that the technology is too expensive must
therefore fail because it is obviously not a concern for the
permitted entity.
Second, even conceding that the cost of partial carbon
capture should be considered, its indirect economic impacts offset
its initial cost. One such indirect economic impact is potential
economic benefits such as tax incentives. Id. at 25. Here,
Sylvanergy would benefit from the federal Renewable Electricity
Production Tax Credit, a per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for
electricity generated by qualified energy resources including
biomass. Id. at 26. This economic benefit mitigates the cost of
partial carbon capture and storage.
Third, the adverse environmental impacts of the Sustainable
Forest Plan far outweigh any economic concern about partial
carbon capture and storage. The EPA recognizes that “where the
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record shows that requiring a particular control option as BACT
would counteract, or work at cross purposes from, policies
intended to promote renewable energy and biomass, this may
form part of the justification for eliminating an option from
further consideration.” Id. at 25.
The EPA, and agencies
exercising its delegated authority, are “charged with being the
federal government’s guardian of the environment.” State of New
York v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 978 (1984).
Certainly, selecting a technology that “destroy[s] biodiversity and
promote[s] tree diseases and pest invasions” does not coincide
with the permitting authority’s role as guardian of the
environment. See R. at 12. The permitting authority should—
indeed must—consider these serious threats to the environment.
Here, however, NUARB merely winked at the allegations with
complete disregard. Id. This neglect not only makes its decision
arbitrary and capricious but also violates the clear statutory
mandate of the CAA itself. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012) (defining
BACT as “taking into account . . . environmental . . . impacts).
Due to the Sustainable Forest Plan’s adverse environmental
impacts, the partial carbon capture and storage facility is the
most effective control technology that was not eliminated at some
other step in the BACT analysis. Failing to eliminate the
Sustainable Forest Plan in Step Four was clear error by NUARB.
Its decision should therefore be vacated, and this Court should
remand the case for a correct BACT analysis.

CONCLUSION

Sylvanergy does not have the luxury of invoking this Court’s
jurisdiction over its untimely petition to review a state agency’s
applicability determination—and even if it could, the state agency
made the correct applicability determination. Additionally, the
Supreme Court’s decision in UARG subjects Sylvanergy to PSD
review for its GHG emissions. Last, NUARB erred in its BACT
analysis.
In other words, NUARB made one correct
determination that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review and one
incorrect determination that this Court should remand in order to
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correct the error. Therefore, in order to further the purpose of the
Clean Air Act, this Court should remand the PSD permit to
“insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent
with the preservation of existing clean air resources.” 42 U.S.C. §
7470(3) (2012).
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